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I. INTRODUCTION
If you walk along practically any beach in Santa Barbara,
California, you will likely discover a sticky black substance attached
to the bottom of your feet. You will find the source of this substance
if you look just offshore—offshore oil and natural gas drilling
platforms. The presence of oil and natural gas drilling platforms has
long been a familiar sight off the California coast, as California was
the first site of offshore oil drilling.1 However, many of the drilling
platforms off of the California coast will stop producing significant
amounts of oil or natural gas, and become obsolete in the next twenty
years. This raises the question of what will become of these obsolete
drilling platforms dotting the California coastline.
Traditionally, these obsolete drilling platforms would be
scheduled for decommissioning, and complete removal of the entire
platform would be required.2 The development of the Rigs-to-Reef
Project (“Project”), however, provides another potential option for
the decommissioning of offshore oil and gas drilling platforms. The
Rigs-to-Reef Project allows for partial, rather than complete, removal
of the drilling platforms. The remaining portion of the platform is
then donated to the state and turned into an artificial reef.
The Rigs-to-Reef Project, however, remains controversial.
The controversy consists of two main concerns. The first main
concern is the environmental impact that partial decommissioning
will have on the marine environment. The second main concern is
the economic benefit provided to oil companies, and the liability and

* Emily Edwards is a third year law student at Pepperdine University
School of Law. Emily graduated from the University of California Los Angeles
with a Bachelors of Arts in Political Science. She would like to thank the NAALJ
editors for their hard work and assistance throughout the writing and editing
process. Emily would also like to thank her family and friends for their support
and encouragement.
1

See infra note 5.
See infra note 49. The federal and state leases provided to oil and gas
companies for offshore oil drilling require that once the lease expires, or the
drilling platform becomes obsolete, that the oil or gas company completely remove
the drilling platform and restore the seabed to its natural state. Id.
2
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costs assumed by states that implement the Rigs-to-Reef Project.3
The controversy has caused implementation of the Rigs-to-Reef
Project to be slow. This is especially true regarding implementation
of the Rigs-to-Reef Project in California. It has taken California over
a decade, and three separate legislative attempts, to implement the
Rigs-to-Reef Project.
In September of 2010, the California
Legislature passed A.B. 2503, which finally allows California to
implement the Rigs-to-Reef Project.4
Considering that it took the California Legislature over a
decade to pass a law implementing the Rigs-to-Reef Project, the
question exists as to how A.B. 2503 was finally able to generate
enough legislative and public support to become law. This Comment
will address this question by first examining California’s legislative
history surrounding the Rigs-to-Reef Project and then by evaluating
A.B 2503. The primary focus in evaluating A.B. 2503 will be to
determine whether the law sufficiently addresses the environmental
and economic concerns associated with the controversy surrounding
the Rigs-to-Reef Project. Finally, the Comment will postulate what
future steps remain necessary for the successful implementation of
the Rigs-to-Reef Project in California.
A. Historical Overview of Offshore Oil Drilling
In order to properly discuss A.B. 2503, allowing the
implementation of the Rigs-to-Reef Project in California, it is first
necessary to briefly examine the history of offshore oil drilling in the
United States. The exploration of oil and natural gas resources began
in the late nineteenth century, with the first oil well being drilled off
of the coast of California in 1896.5 The existence of oil and natural
3

See infra note 85. Oil companies would save billions of dollars on
removal costs for each offshore oil and gas platform that they were able to partially
rather than completely remove. Id.
4
California Marine Resources Act, CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 6601
(West 2010).
5
U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, MINERALS MGMT. SERV., LEASING OIL AND
GAS RESOURCES: OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF 3 (2005), available at
http://www.boem.gov/search-results.aspx?q=greenbook-leasingdocument.pdf,
(click on “1. GreenBook-LeasingDocument.pdf”). The first offshore oil rig was
drilled in Summerland, California thirty-eight years after the first onshore oil rig in
Pennsylvania. Id. at 2. These early offshore oil rigs did not resemble the modern
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gas along the coastline combined with the emergence of oil as
America’s primary energy resource encouraged further development
of offshore oil drilling, including the ability to drill for oil in deep,
open water.6
America’s increasing demand for oil combined with the
development of offshore oil drilling further from shore in deeper
waters caused tensions between the Federal Government and the state
governments over jurisdictional control over the waters.7 The states
asserted that they could control the lease agreements for drilling in
the seabed in the waters off of their coast, while the Federal
Government asserted jurisdiction based on the fact that the drilling
was being done in the continental shelf.8 In 1945, President Truman
gave a proclamation in which he recognized the tensions that existed
regarding the jurisdiction of the oil and other natural resources being
extracted from the continental shelf in the coastal waters of the
United States.9 In this proclamation, President Truman established
that the Federal Government had jurisdiction over the natural
resources of the subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf located
off of the coast of the United States.10

floating steel oil rigs that remain in coastal waters today, but the original oil rigs
were built on wooden wharfs that extended into the ocean. Id. at 3.
6
Id. at 2–3. With technological developments in the steel industry, the oil
industry was able to expand its drilling into “open, unprotected waters” by the late
1930’s. Id. at 3. By 1947, the first oil well was drilled in open water from a fixed
platform, which meant drilling was no longer limited to drills attached to wharfs on
shore, but oil drills could be placed further off shore in open water. Id.
7
Dan Rothbach, Rigs-to-Reefs: Refocusing the Debate in California, 17
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 283, 284 (2007). See also U.S. DEP'T OF THE
INTERIOR, MINERALS MGMT. SERV., LEASING OIL AND GAS RESOURCES: OUTER
CONTINENTAL SHELF, supra note 5, at 5.
8
U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, MINERALS MGMT. SERV., LEASING OIL AND
GAS RESOURCES: OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF, supra note 5, at 5. See also
Rothbach, supra note 7, at 284.
9
Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12303 (Oct. 1, 1945).
10
Id. President Truman outlines the rational for federal jurisdiction by
stating that
concern for the urgency of conserving and prudently utilizing its
natural resources, the Government of the United States regards
the natural resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the continental
shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous to the coasts of the
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In the late 1940’s, in an effort to assert the jurisdictional
rights it had established in the 1945 Proclamation, the Federal
Government brought suit against California seeking to enjoin
California from trespassing on the natural resources of the seabed
subject to federal jurisdiction.11 California responded to the claim
admitting that it had been issuing leases to individuals and
corporations for the extraction of petroleum, but asserted it was
acting within its jurisdiction as these leases only allowed extraction
of petroleum from land within the three miles subject to state
jurisdiction.12 The Supreme Court recognized states’ interests in
having jurisdiction over the natural resources of the seabed and
continental shelf.13 However, the Supreme Court then went on to
validate the 1945 Proclamation by upholding the Federal
Government’s jurisdiction over all oil and other natural resources of
the seabed and continental shelf, and refused to limit the Federal
Government’s jurisdiction to beyond a three mile boundary from the

United States as appertaining to the United States, subject to its
jurisdiction and control.
Id. He further specified the federal jurisdiction by specifically declaring that “all
sea [bed] natural resources beyond the [three] mile jurisdiction of most coastal
states were the property of the United States.” Id. Thus coastal states had limited
jurisdiction over the seabed, which extended up to three miles from shore, but the
seabed beyond the three miles was subject to federal jurisdiction. See U.S. DEP'T
OF THE INTERIOR, MINERALS MGMT. SERV., LEASING O IL AND GAS RESOURCES:
OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF, supra note 5, at 5.
11

United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 23, supplemented sub nom.
United States v. California, 332 U.S. 804 (1947). The United States government
alleged that:
California, acting pursuant to state statutes, but without authority
from the United States, has negotiated and executed numerous
leases with persons and corporations purporting to authorize
them to enter upon the described ocean area to take petroleum,
gas, and other mineral deposits, and that the lessees have done so,
paying to California large sums of money in rents and royalties
for the petroleum products taken . . . .
Id.
12
13

Id. at 23–24.
Id.
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coastline.14 When Louisiana and Texas challenged the federal
jurisdiction over oil drilling and exploration within their states
claiming they were the “sole owners of the offshore seabed adjacent
to their coast,” this Supreme Court decision was extended to both
states.15
In response to these Supreme Court decisions, in 1953,
Congress passed the Submerged Lands Act, which provided states
with jurisdiction over the natural resources and the seabed up to three
nautical miles from the states’ coastline.16
In enacting this
legislation, Congress recognized that states should have some control
over the management and development of the natural resources and
the seabed directly off of their coast.17 Although the Submerged
14

Id. at 40–41. Thus, the Supreme Court established federal jurisdiction
over the entire seabed and continental shelf, without being subject to limitation by
state jurisdiction. See also Rothbach, supra note 7, at 284–85.
15
Id.; see also United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950),
superseded by statute, Submerged Lands Act, ch. 65, 67 Stat. 29 (1953); United
States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950), superseded by statute, Submerged Lands Act,
ch. 65, 67 Stat. 29 (1953). The coastal states sought to control the oil drilling and
natural resources off of their coasts, resented the fact that the Federal Government
was leasing oil wells without state permission, and sought control over these
lucrative and important natural resources. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF THE
INTERIOR, MINERALS MGMT. SERV., LEASING OIL AND GAS RESOURCES: OUTER
CONTINENTAL SHELF, supra note 5, at 5.
16
43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (2002). With the Submerged Lands Act,
Congress directly contradicted the previous Supreme Court decisions, which had
established federal jurisdiction over all of the natural resources and the seabed.
The Supreme Court later upheld the Submerged Lands Act stating that Congress
had the power to relinquish, to the states, the federal government's property rights
over the submerged lands without interfering with U.S. national sovereign interests.
See Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 273–76 (1954).
17
43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315. Congress specifically stated that:
It is hereby determined and declared to be in the public interest
that (1) title to and ownership of the lands beneath navigable
waters within the boundaries of the respective States, and the
natural resources within such lands and waters, and (2) the right
and power to manage, administer, lease, develop, and use the said
lands and natural resources all in accordance with applicable
State law . . . .
Thus Congress, by providing the states with some jurisdictional control over the
natural resources and seabed up to three nautical miles from the coastline, sought to
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Lands Act clarified federal and state jurisdiction over the natural
resources and seabed, it did not include provisions on leasing or
development of the submerged lands.18 Congress enacted the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) in 1953 in an effort to
establish leasing and development policies and procedures for the
submerged lands.19 Under the OCSLA, the Secretary of the Interior
oversees the mineral exploration and development of the outer
continental shelf.20 The OCSLA was primarily concerned with
encouraging the development of oil exploration, and thus only
provided limited regulation of the oil exploration and drilling along
the continental shelf.21
The state and federal governments both encouraged the
development and exploration of offshore oil drilling into the late
1960’s.22 This lead to the first major environmental disaster related
to offshore oil drilling, an oil and natural gas leak that occurred in
1969.23 Union Oil had received a lease from the Federal Government
to conduct offshore oil drilling about five miles off of the coast of

promote the development and exploration of offshore energy resources, especially
oil and natural gas. Id.
18
Rothbach, supra note 7, at 285; see also H.R. REP. NO. 83-413, at 1
(1953), reprinted in 1953 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2177, 2177.
19
OCS Lands Act History, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT.,
http://www.boem.gov/Oil-and-Gas-Energy-Program/Leasing/Outer-ContinentalShelf/Lands-Act-History/OCSLA-HIstory.aspx.
20
Id. The OCSLA authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to lease land in
the outer continental shelf, subject to federal jurisdiction, to the “highest qualified
responsible bidder” through a competitive bidding process. Id. The OCSLA
provides guidelines for the oil and gas exploration and development on the
continental shelf, and allows the Secretary to adjust regulations as necessary. Id.
21
H.R. REP. NO. 83-413, at 4 (1953). The OCSLA’s main provision
regulating the leases and oil drilling only required the “exercise of reasonable
diligence in the operation of the lease and to conduct [the] operations in a sound
and efficient oilfield practice so as to prevent waste therein.” Id. Thus, the
OCSLA generally refrained from implementing new or changing preexisting safety
and environmental regulations for oil drilling, but instead applied the established
industry practices to offshore oil drilling on the continental shelf. Id.; see also
Rothbach, supra note 7, at 285.
22
Sean B. Hecht, California’s New Rigs-to-Reefs Law, UCLA INST. OF
THE ENV’T AND SUSTAINABILITY, available at
http://www.environment.ucla.edu/reportcard/article.asp?parentid=9389.
23
Rothbach, supra note 7, at 285–86.
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Santa Barbara, California.24 During the drilling process, pressure
began to build in the casing surrounding the oil well, causing the
casing on the well to split and large cracks to form in the seabed
surrounding the well.25 Large amounts of oil and natural gas were
released from the well and seabed, causing thirty-five miles of
coastline to be covered in oil and eight hundred square miles of ocean
to be affected by the oil spill.26 This oil spill resulted in public and
political backlash against the oil companies and raised new concerns
regarding offshore oil drilling.27 In response to the spill, California
exercised its jurisdiction over state waters by refusing to allow the
development of new offshore oil drilling sites.28 The Federal
Government continued to allow development of new oil drilling sites
in federal waters until 1984.29 In 1984, Congress banned the use of
federal funds for new oil development off the California coast.30
Also, as a direct result of the oil spill, the Federal
Government passed several acts that sought to regulate offshore oil
drilling.31 These acts include the National Environmental Protection
Policy Act and the Coastal Zone Management Act. The National
Environmental Protection Policy Act requires a detailed
environmental review before any major or controversial federal
action can be taken, while the Coastal Zone Management Act
requires state review of any federal action that will affect the land
and water use of the coastal zone.32 Despite this increased federal
regulation, it remained unclear whether environmental reports were

24
K.C. Clarke & Jeffrey J. Hemphill, The Santa Barbara Oil Spill, A
Retrospective, Y.B. OF THE ASS’N OF PAC. COAST GEOGRAPHERS, at 157–162
(2002), available at
http://www.geog.ucsb.edu/~kclarke/Papers/SBOilSpill1969.pdf; see also Rothbach,
supra note 7, at 286.
25
Clarke, supra note 24, at 157–58.
26
Id. at 160–61.
27
Id. at 161.
28
Hecht, supra note 22.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
OCS Lands Act History, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., supra
note 19.
32
Id.
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required for leases associated with oil exploration.33 This question
was answered in 1978, when Congress amended the OCSLA.34 The
amendments require an environmental review for all leases that are a
major federal action and concern the development and exploration of
oil.35
Furthermore, states can review this action and the
environmental reports based on the Coastal Zone Management Act.36
In 1982, the Secretary of the Interior created the Minerals
Management Service (MMS).37 MMS is the administrative agency
that oversees leasing of the submerged outer continental shelf lands
and offshore oil drilling operations.38 The MMS analyzes the
environmental review statement and ensures that states have notice of
and the opportunity to review the leasing proposal.39 Before granting
a lease for offshore oil drilling, MMS must consider the alternatives
to the leasing proposal, the environmental impact of the drilling, and
whether the lease will comply with state regulations.40 In the event
that the lease expires or the oil rig no longer produces oil, the lease
agreement and current law require that the oil rig structure be
completely removed, both below and above the water, and that the
seabed be returned to its prior natural state.41
B. Development of the Rigs-To-Reef Project
The Rigs-to-Reef Project was created by the MMS in an
attempt to support the National Artificial Reef Plan (NARP) created
under the National Fishing Enforcement Act of 1984 (NFEA).42

33

See Rothbach, supra note 7, at 286.
Id.
35
Id.; see also 43 U.S.C. § 1351(f) (2000).
36
43 U.S.C. § 1351(h)(1) (2000).
37
OCS Lands Act History, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., supra

34

note 19.
38

Id.
U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, MINERALS MGMT. SERV., LEASING OIL
AND GAS RESOURCES: OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF, supra note 5, at 17, 21.
40
Id.
41
Hecht, supra note 22.
42
Rigs-to-Reefs Information: What is Rigs-to-Reefs and how does it relate
to the mission of the Minerals Management Service (MMS)?, BUREAU OF OCEAN
ENERGY
MGMT.,
REG.
AND
ENFORCEMENT,
39
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NFEA sought to prevent fish degradation within the United States
coastal waters.43 As part of NFEA, the Federal Government
established an artificial reef program under NARP.44 NARP sought
to “promote and facilitate responsible and effective artificial reef use
based on the best scientific information available” in order to sustain
and potentially increase the fish and marine life populations in
coastal waters.45 These artificial reefs were intended to create
abundant recreational and commercial fishing areas in coastal
waters.46 The Act provides that the Secretaries of Commerce and
Army Corps of Engineers shall administer, monitor, and encourage
the development of the artificial reefs.47 Generally, coastal states
have been enthusiastic about implementing NARP, and the states are

http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/homepg/regulate/environ/rigs-toreefs/information.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2011), [hereinafter What is Rigs-toReefs].
43
See Rothbach, supra note 7, at 287.
44
Pub. L. No. 98-623, § 204, 98 Stat. 3395 (1984).
45
National Artificial Reef Plan (as Amended): Guidelines for Siting,
Construction, Development, and Assessment of Artificial Reefs, U.S. DEP’T OF
COMMERCE AND NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., at 1–2 (2007),
available
at
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/PartnershipsCommunications/NARPwCover3.pdf
[hereinafter National Artificial Reef Plan].
46
33 U.S.C.A. § 2102 (2011).
47
National Artificial Reef Plan, supra note 45, at vi. The Secretary of
Commerce oversees the Artificial Reef Plan, which provides guidance to states and
organizations that want to create artificial reefs in the coastal waters and along the
outer continental shelf. Id. The Army Corps of Engineers issues the actual permits
for the artificial reefs, and thus the Secretary of the Army must
consult with and consider the views of appropriate local, state,
and federal agencies and other interested parties; ensure that the
provisions for siting, constructing, monitoring, and managing
artificial reefs are consistent with established criteria and
standards; and ensure that the title to the artificial reef
construction material is unambiguous and that responsibility for
maintenance and the financial ability to assume liability is clearly
established.
Id.
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working with the Army Corps of Engineers to meet the requirements
of the Plan in order to effectively create the artificial reefs.48
C. Implementation of the Rigs-to-Reef Program
The success of NARP encouraged the MMS to adopt the
national Rigs-to-Reefs Project.49 The Project allows for partial rather
than complete removal of oil rig platforms whose leases have expired
or that no longer produce oil.50 The remaining parts of the platform

48

Id. Due to the state cooperation and implementation in creating
artificial reefs, the National Artificial Reefs Plan is generally considered to be a
success. Id. at 2.
49
What is Rigs-to-Reefs, supra note 42. In 1993 and again in 1998, the
MMS announced its support for the artificial reef program and encouraged the
continued development of the Rigs-to-Reef Project. See LES DAUTERIVE, RIGS-TOREEFS POLICY, PROGRESS, AND PERSPECTIVE OCS REPORT MMS 2000-073, 2
(2000).
The MMS supports and encourages the reuse of obsolete offshore
petroleum structures as artificial reefs in U.S. waters. The
structure must not pose an unreasonable impediment to future
mineral development. The reuse RTR plan must comply with the
artificial reef permitting requirements of the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers and the criteria in the National Artificial Reef Plan.
The state agency responsible for managing marine fisheries
resources must accept liability for the structure before MMS will
release the Federal lessee from obligations in the lease
instrument.
Id.
50

Hecht, supra note 22. All federal leases that authorized the oil drilling
and exploration required complete removal of the drilling platform and
reestablishment of the seabed to its condition prior to drilling. Id. In order to
return the seabed to its condition prior to drilling, the oil company must completely
remove the drilling platform both above and below the water, seal all oil and
natural gas wells, and either remove or treat the shell mounds. Id. Shell mounds
refer to debris that has fallen from the oil rig platform and has been covered by
shells and other marine life overtime. Id. The shell mounds often contain drilling
byproducts such as hydrocarbons or metals; thus, the shell mounds must be
removed entirely or treated in order to prevent the byproducts from contaminating
the marine environment overtime. Id. The Rigs-to-Reef program provides an
alternative to complete removal for qualifying offshore oil drilling sites. Id.
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are then converted into artificial reefs.51
The MMS allows for three options when an oil-drilling site
qualifies for partial, rather than complete, removal.52 The first form
of removal is the Tow and Place Platform where a cable is attached
to the remaining rig structure, and then a boat tows the structure to
the designated location where the rig is then submerged.53 The next
option for partial removal is the Topple In Place Platform, where the
platform remains in the same location as it previously stood at the
drilling site and is simply toppled on its side so that the remaining
portion of the platform is completely submerged.54 The third option
is the Partial Removal In Place Platform, which requires the oil
company to remove a certain portion of the platform, typically any
part of the platform above a certain depth and any portion above
water.55 The remaining part of the platform is completely submerged
and left at the drilling site.56 When a site qualifies for partial
removal, either the MMS (if the rig was located in federal waters) or
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (if the rig was located within state
waters) will determine which method will comply most with the
objectives of NARP.57
The MMS recognized that using explosives in the removal
process was likely to be detrimental to the marine environment that
the Rigs-to-Reef Project was attempting to preserve. Therefore, the
MMS created the option for oil companies to allow the well
conductors to remain intact up to the same depth that the platform
jacket would remain intact.58 The MMS provided this option after

51

DAUTERIVE, supra note 49, at 3.
Id.
53
Id. at Figure 4.
54
Id. at Figure 5.
55
Id. at Figure 6.
56
DAUTERIVE, supra note 49, at Figure 6.
57
Id. at 2–3. Both the MMS and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers are
concerned with ensuring that the least damage possible is done to the marine
environment when the decommissioning and partial removal takes place; thus, the
method of removal must be determined on a case-by-case basis. See Hecht, supra
note 22.
58
Artificial Reefs: Oases for Marine Life in the Gulf, BUREAU OF OCEAN
ENERGY
52
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conducting a study to find the depth at which a well conductor’s
structural integrity would likely fail.59 After determining this depth,
the MMS concluded that allowing the retention of the well
conductors at the same depth as the platform jacket would not
increase the potential for structural failure.60 By allowing the well
components to remain intact at the specified depth, the MMS
eliminated the need for explosives in the removal process, thus
minimizing the impact the removal process would have on marine
life around the oil drilling site.61
Not all oil rigs qualify for partial removal under the Rigs-toReef Project. To determine eligibility, coastal states must first
submit artificial reef development plans to the MMS for approval.62
Since coastal states create the initial artificial reef plan, oil and gas
companies who want to donate their obsolete oil and gas rigs to the
Rigs-to-Reef Project are forced to cooperate with the states in the
planning and implementation of the decommissioning process.63
MGMT., REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT,
http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/homepg/regulate/environ/rigs-to-reefs/artificialreefs.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2011).
By allowing the oil companies to leave the well conductors intact at a
certain depth, the MMS essentially eliminated the need for the use of explosives
during the removal process, as explosives are not necessary to remove the
shallower portions of the well conductors or other remaining parts of the oil
platforms.
59
DAUTERIVE, supra note 49, at 4. The study showed that the well
conductor would likely fail at -16 feet below the mud line. Id.
60
Id. The MMS requires that the platform jacket be removed up to a
depth of -150 feet below the mud line. This depth is much greater than the depth at
which the study found structural failure was likely to occur. Thus, allowing the
retention of the well components at the same depth as the platform jacket should
not create additional environmental concerns associated with partial removal as the
structural integrity will not be affected by the toppling of the remaining portions of
the oil platform. Id.
61
Id.
62
What is Rigs-to-Reefs, supra note 42. The artificial reef plans that
coastal states must submit to the MMS if the state wants to participate in the Rigsto-Reef Project in order to create artificial reefs in its coastal waters must be statespecific and identify offshore areas and specific sites suitable for artificial reefs and
the potential decommissioning of oil and gas platforms. Id.
63
Id. In order to submit the artificial reef plans, state officials must
determine whether the state wants to acquire a decommissioned oil or gas drilling
structure as part of its artificial reef plan. Id. If the state determines that it does
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Once the planning process is complete and the structure is donated to
the state, the state accepts the title and responsibility for the structure
as an artificial reef.64
The Rigs-to-Reef Project has experienced only moderate
success in terms of state implementation.65 Implementation has been
limited to decommissioned oil and gas drilling sites in the Gulf of
Mexico.66 However, even the states that have implemented the
Project have limited implementation. 67 This is largely a result of the
controversy surrounding the Project.
D. The Debate Surrounding the Rigs-to-Reef Project
The partial decommissioning of the oil and gas platforms has
polarized supporters and opponents of the Project, and created a
continuing debate. 68 The debate concerns the legal, policy, and
environmental issues associated with the Rigs-to-Reef Project. 69
want to acquire the structure, and thus participate in the Rigs-to-Reef Project, the
state officials then work with the oil or gas company that owns the structure to
meet the permit requirements of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers who oversee
the permitting process allowing for participation in the Rigs-to-Reef project. Id.
The state officials and oil or gas company agents will then negotiate the terms of
the donation of donating the structure to the state. What is Rigs-to-Reefs, supra
note 42.
64
Id.
65
DAUTERIVE, supra note 49, at 3. As of the end of 1999, 1,879 oil and
gas platforms were no longer producing gas or oil and were scheduled for
decommissioning. Id. at 4. Of these platforms 1,728 were completely removed
from the coastal waters of the Gulf of Mexico. Id. Thus, 151, or less than 1%, of
the oil and gas rigs were accepted for and donated to the Rigs-to-Reef Project. Id.
Of these 151 platforms, Louisiana accepted 94 oil and gas platform donations, and
Texas accepted 50 donations. Id. at 3, Table 1. Therefore, as of the end of 1999
only two Gulf States have implemented the Rigs-to-Reef Project to a significant
extent.
Furthermore as of 2010, state implementation of the Rigs-to-Reef Project
had only slightly increased. See Hecht, supra note 22. By 2010, 3,000 oil and gas
drilling platforms had been decommissioned in the Gulf of Mexico; however, only
260 of these platforms had been accepted and donated to the Rigs-to-Reef Project
to create artificial reefs. Id.
66
DAUTERIVE, supra note 49, at 3.
67
Id. at 4.
68
Hecht, supra note 22; see also What is Rigs-to-Reefs, supra note 42.
69
Hecht, supra note 22; see also Rothbach, supra note 7, at 288.
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These concerns have caused various interest groups to adamantly
support or oppose the Project and have led to unlikely coalitions
between interest groups that usually have divergent viewpoints.70
The primary interest groups involved in the debate are oil companies,
environmental groups, recreational fishermen, and commercial
fishermen.71 These interest groups are then divided into those who
oppose and those who support the Project.72 Supporters of the
Project, the pro side, generally consist of oil companies, certain
environmental groups and advocates, and recreational fishermen.73
The opponents, the con side, generally consist of other environmental
groups and advocates as well as commercial fishermen.74 Although
the pro and con coalitions have created unlikely coalition
partnerships,75 each interest group within the pro and con coalitions
has its own rationale for choosing whether to support or oppose the
Project.76
The oil and gas companies, as one of the most significantly
affected interest groups involved in the Project, support the Project
for a variety of reasons.77 Prior to the implementation of the Project,
federal law required oil and gas companies to completely remove all
obsolete drilling platforms.78 The removal of these platforms was
extremely expensive for oil and gas companies; thus the Project,
which allows for partial removal of qualifying oil and gas platforms,
70

Rothbach, supra note 7, at 288. The debate surrounding the Rigs-toReef Project concerns not only state interests with creating the artificial reefs, but
also involves the interests of oil companies, environmental groups, and recreational
and commercial fishermen. Each of these interest groups has their own concerns
regarding the implementation of the Rigs-to-Reef Project, and these interest groups
often create coalitions based on their own concerns in an attempt to persuade the
state officials to enact the policy most beneficial to their interests. Id.
71
Id. at 288–89.
72
Hecht, supra note 22.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Rothbach, supra note 7, at 288–89.
76
Id. at 289.
77
Id.
78
See supra note 50 and accompanying text. The Federal Government
requires the complete removal of all oil and gas drilling rig platforms once the
platforms become obsolete, and the seabed must be returned to its natural state
prior to the drilling. Id.
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can significantly lower the costs of removal for the oil and gas
companies.79 Furthermore, the Project provides some flexibility for
oil and gas companies in their determination of what to do with an
obsolete oil or gas platform.80 If an obsolete oil or gas platform
qualifies to become an artificial reef under the Project, the owner of
the platform can either choose to participate in the Project and donate
the platform for an artificial reef or comply with federal regulations
and completely remove the rig platform.81
The flexibility and lower expense of removal raises concerns
with opponents of the Rigs-to-Reef Project.82 Opponents argue that
it is unfair to provide the oil and gas companies with lower removal
expenses after they have profited from the oil and gas extracted by
the platforms.83 Furthermore, opponents also argue that providing
the oil or gas companies with a reduction in the removal costs after

79

Rothbach, supra note 7, at 289. With the increasing depth of the oil and
gas rigs in coastal waters, especially off the California coast, complete removal of
the rigs can be extremely expensive. The exact cost depends on a multitude of
factors including the method used to remove the structure, the method and location
of the disposal or recycling of the structural debris, and whether or not the shell
mounds that develop around the submerged portions of the structure have to be
decontaminated or removed in addition to the oil or gas rig structure. Hecht, supra
note 22. Experts have estimated that the cost of removing the twenty-seven oil rigs
scheduled for decommissioning off of the California coast will be over one billion
dollars. Id. The partial removal allowed by the Rigs-to-Reef Project significantly
reduces the cost of removal as it allows the oil or gas company to leave the lower
portions of the oil or gas well intact, and only requires that the well be sealed and
the upper portion of the platform be removed. Id. Thus, the oil or gas companies
can potentially limit the expense of the removal process depending on whether the
decommissioned rig qualifies for the Rigs-to-Reef Project. Id.
80
Rothbach, supra note 7, at 289.
81
Id. The flexibility provided by the Rigs-to-Reef Project allows oil and
gas companies more options than were historically available after an oil or gas rig
became obsolete. Thus, the companies can determine which choice is most
beneficial depending on the specific rig being decommissioned. Id.
82
Id. See also Hecht, supra note 22.
83
Hecht, supra note 22. The oil and gas rigs often produce large amounts
of oil or gas before becoming obsolete as the leases provided for the drilling sights
are for significant amounts of time, and only after an oil or gas rig has stopped
producing oil or gas does the rig become obsolete and subject to decommissioning
and removal. Thus, opponents argue that because the oil or gas companies have
significantly profited from the oil or gas rigs, they should not be provided with a
reduction in the removal cost. Id.
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the leases for the drilling site have been signed is inequitable.84
Generally the leases for the drilling sites include removal provisions
requiring the complete removal of the oil or gas platform.85 Thus, oil
and gas companies are aware of the removal requirements upon
signing the lease and have assumingly budgeted for the expensive
removal process.86 The cost benefit provided to oil and gas
companies associated with removal expenses remains the main
concern that opponents to the Rigs-to-Reef Project raise regarding
the benefits afforded to oil companies; however, the oil companies
are not the only proponents of the Rigs-to-Reef Project.
The Rigs-to-Reef Project has divided environmental groups
and advocates, as some remain proponents of the Project while others
adamantly oppose it.87 Those who support the Rigs-to-Reef Project
argue that oil and gas platforms attract marine life, and thus removal
of the platforms would disturb the marine environment that has
developed around the platform.88 Furthermore, studies have shown
that complete removal of the oil or gas rig platforms may be more
detrimental to the marine mammals, bird populations, and water and
air quality, at least in the short term, rather than partial removal.89
84

Rothbach, supra note 7, at 289.
Id.
86
Id. Opponents of the Rigs-to-Reef Project assert that because the oil
and gas companies knew about the removal requirements when they signed the oil
or gas drilling leases, it is unnecessary and inequitable to reduce the removal costs
after the leases have been signed, and the companies have profited from the rigs.
Id. at 291.
87
Id. at 290–91. The scientific research surrounding the Rigs-to-Reef
Project is not entirely conclusive as to whether the partial removal benefits or
harms the marine environments because the long-term effects of the artificial reefs
created by the oil and gas rig platforms are still unknown. Hecht, supra note 22.
The inconclusiveness of the scientific research is the main cause of the split in the
environmental community in regards to opposition or support for the Project. Id.
88
Id. Though the environmental studies are inconclusive, the proponents
of the Rigs-to-Reef Project rely on studies showing that the oil and gas platforms in
coastal waters have increased fish populations within the surrounding area. Some
studies even indicate that the rigs have helped to increase the stock of fish that were
previously declining before the rigs were placed in the marine environment. Id.
89
BROCK B. BERNSTEIN, CALIFORNIA OCEAN SCIENCE TRUST,
EVALUATING THE ALTERNATIVES FOR DECOMMISSIONING CALIFORNIA’S OFFSHORE
OIL AND GAS PLATFORMS: A TECHNICAL ANALYSIS TO INFORM STATE POLICY,
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 6–8 (2007). The California Natural Resources Agency
85
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The complete removal also has an immediate impact on the marine
life surrounding the oil or gas platform.90
Furthermore,
environmental proponents of the Project point to higher fish densities
on the artificial reefs created by the oil and gas platforms than on
natural reefs. 91 The proponents then argue that higher fish density
indicates that the oil and gas platforms contribute to the growth of the
marine environment, and therefore should only be partially
removed.92 Environmental proponents of the Rigs-to-Reef Project
point to these studies and the impact that complete removal has on
the marine life and the air and water quality surrounding an oil or gas

partnered with the California Ocean Science Trust in order to conduct a study to
investigate the environmental and policy issues surrounding alternatives to the
decommissioning of California’s twenty-seven oil and gas platforms in California’s
coastal waters. Id. at i. The study compared the environmental and policy
consequences associated with complete and partial removal of the oil and gas
drilling platforms. Id. at 3, 5. The study found that complete removal would likely
have a more negative impact on marine mammals, bird populations, and water and
air quality in the short term because of the large equipment used to remove the oil
and gas platforms. Id. at 6. Complete removal of the oil and gas platforms requires
the use of diesel Heavy Lift Vessels and other support vessels for extended periods
of time. Id. at 7. This equipment releases large quantities of emissions that affect
both the water and air quality around an oil or gas platform. Id. Furthermore, the
complete removal of the oil or gas rig is a prolonged process causing disruption to
the marine environment for an extended period of time. Thus, at least in the short
term, the environmental impacts of complete removal seem greater than those of
partial removal. Id.
90
Id. at 7–8. Complete removal requires that all parts of the oil or gas
platform must be removed and the seabed returned to the condition it was in before
the oil or gas platform was installed. The removal includes all submerged portions
of the rig and those parts below the mud line, the line where the water and seabed
meet. See DAUTERIVE, supra note 49. The complete removal leads to the death of
all marine organisms attached to the oil or gas platform itself, and leads to the
dispersal of fish from the area surrounding the rig. BERNSTEIN, supra note 89, at
7–8. The fish that had previously lived in the artificial reef created by the oil or gas
rig, and the organisms that attach themselves to the rig platform, will leave the area
to find other undisturbed reefs. Id. During the dispersal process there may be a
high fish mortality rate as the fish attempt to find new reefs to inhabit. Id.
91
BERNSTEIN, supra note 89, at 7–8. The California Ocean Science Trust
study found higher density fish communities with larger fish on the artificial reefs
created by the oil and gas rigs than on natural reefs. This remained particularly true
with rockfish, indicating that the rockfish may be using the artificial reefs created
by the oil and gas rigs as nursery areas for their young. Id.
92
Id.
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platform, to argue that the complete removal is more detrimental to
the marine environment than partial removal.93
However, not all studies support this conclusion drawn by
environmental proponents of the Rigs-to-Reef Project.
Environmental groups and advocates who oppose the Project
concentrate on the uncertainty surrounding the long-term effects that
partial removal of oil and gas platforms may have on the marine
environment.94 Environmental opponents to the Rigs-to-Reef Project
argue that even the California Ocean Science Trust study, which the
environmental proponents have relied on to assert the benefits of
partial removal over complete removal, is inconclusive.95 The study
openly admits that much of the data and conclusions reported in the
study are drawn from estimates rather than quantitative comparisons
of various oil or gas platforms.96 Moreover, the environmental
opponents point to the fact that the study was only intended to be the
beginning of a continuing process in order to help state officials
understand the environmental and policy consequences of partial
93

Hecht, supra note 22; see also Rothbach, supra note 7, at 291.
Hecht, supra note 22. Environmental opponents argue that no studies
have conclusively shown that the increase in fish populations in areas around oil
and gas rig platforms will continue over time. The opponents question whether the
rigs are contributing to the regional marine habitat or whether the rigs simply
attract local marine life to one area. Id.
95
Id. The California Ocean Science Trust Study concluded that partial
removal of oil and gas rigs could potentially benefit marine life by causing fewer
disturbances of the artificial reefs already developing around the rigs. See
BERNSTEIN, supra note 89, at 7–9. However, this study only evaluated the
environmental and policy consequences associated with partial removal down to
eighty-five feet below sea level. Id. Additionally, the study did not evaluate the
ecological benefits or harms associated with partial removal of any particular oil or
gas rig platform, but instead reviewed and synthesized previously existing
scientific and economic information in order to create the report. Hecht, supra note
22.
96
See BERNSTEIN, supra note 89, at 8. The study used data from other
surveys that had monitored fish populations at oil and gas platforms rather than
generating its own data regarding the fish populations. Moreover, the study
specifically states “data gaps prevented quantitative comparisons of platform
production to that in other communities and ecosystems in southern California, or
any rigorous estimate of the overall contribution of platform communities to the
regional ecosystem.” Id. Thus, environmentalist opponents to the Rigs-to-Reef
Project argue that the study itself recognizes the inconclusiveness of its findings.
Hecht, supra note 22.
94
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versus complete removal of oil and gas platforms.97 Thus, the
environmental opponents of the Rigs-to-Reef Project argue that the
environmental proponents have misused the study in an attempt to
generate support for the Project when in actuality the study admits
that its findings are inconclusive.98
Environmental proponents and opponents to the Rigs-to-Reef
Project agree that continued research is necessary in order to settle
the environmental debate surrounding the Rigs-to-Reef Project. Both
sides recognize that the environmental impact of complete or partial
removal of an oil or gas platform may depend on a case-by-case
basis.99 Therefore, both opponents and proponents agree that the
decisions, regarding what type of decommissioning plan is
appropriate for obsolete oil or gas platforms, must be made on an
individual basis.100
There is one more interest group that has divided itself among
the pro and con coalitions. The interest group consists of both
commercial and recreational fishermen.101 Generally, recreational
fishermen tend to be proponents of the Rigs-to-Reef Project, while
commercial fishermen tend to oppose the Project.102 The recreational
fishermen are some of the strongest proponents of the Rigs-to-Reef
Project as seen by the passage of the National Fishing Enhancement
Act (NFEA).103 The recreational fishermen tend to view the Rigs-toReef Project as a program that will increase the fish populations and
create localized fishing areas.104 They argue that the artificial reefs
created by the partial removal allowed by the Rigs-to-Reef Project
provide a marine environment where large amounts of fish live, thus
forming a popular recreational fishing area.105 These recreational
97

Hecht, supra note 22.
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Rothbach, supra note 7, at 290.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 290. One of the main objectives of the NFEA was to prevent the
degradation of fish populations through the creation of artificial reefs. See Pub. L.
No. 98-623, § 204, 98 Stat. 3395 (1984); Rothbach, supra note 7; National
Artificial Reef Plan, supra note 45.
104
Rothbach, supra note 7, at 289–90.
105
Id.
98
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fishing areas will generate increased revenue for the state, as interest
in the industry will increase if fish populations are abundant and
recreational fishing sites are established.106
Opposing the recreational fishermen and the Rigs-to-Reef
Project are the commercial fishermen. Commercial fishermen in
California have been particularly opposed to the implementation of
the Rigs-to-Reef Project, as the commercial fishing industry in
California generally relies on trawlers to catch fish.107 The trawlers
can easily become caught on underwater structures, which can result
in damage to fishing equipment.108 Thus, commercial fisherman see
the partial removal of the oil and gas platforms as potentially
detrimental to their industry as platforms will become permanent
underwater structures that their nets can get caught on, not only
ruining that particular haul of fish, but potentially damaging their
fishing equipment.109
Furthermore, the commercial fishermen
partner with environmentalists who oppose the Rigs-to-Reef Project
and argue that the artificial reefs created by the Rigs-to-Reef Project
may become subject to fishing pressure that would reduce fish
populations after the oil or gas platform was decommissioned and
donated to the Rigs-to-Reef Project.110 The commercial fishermen
106

Id. Recreational fishing generates a significant amount of revenue for
states as demonstrated by the estimate that recreational fishing contributed nearly
five billion dollars to the California economy in the 1992 fiscal year. Id.
107
Id. Trawlers “are nets towed at various depths to catch fish or
shellfish. Trawl nets, which can be as large as a football field, are either dragged
along the sea floor or midway between the floor and the surface.” Fishing &
Farming Methods: Trawls and dredges, MONTEREY BAY AQUARIUM SEAFOOD
WATCH,
http://www.montereybayaquarium.org/cr/cr_seafoodwatch/sfw_gear.aspx#trawling
(last visited Dec. 30, 2012).
108
Rothbach, supra note 7, at 290.
109
Id.
110
BERNSTEIN, supra note 89, at 8. The commercial fishermen and
environmentalist opponents point to the California Ocean Science Trust study
which specifically stated that one of the risks of partial removal would be that the
artificial reefs created by the platforms would be subject to fishing pressures with
little, if any, restrictions. Id. The study explains that any restrictions placed on the
artificial reefs by the California Department of Fish and Game would only be
applicable to state vessels and not international or non-state fishing vessels. Also,
any fishing restrictions could be considered contrary to the National Fishing
Enactment Act, which helped lead to the development of the Rigs-to-Reefs Project,
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are concerned that over fishing of these artificial reefs could
negatively impact the commercial fishing industry.111
Though each of the interest groups, including the oil
companies, environmental groups, and fishermen, has its own
concerns and agenda for choosing whether to support or oppose the
Rigs-to-Reef Project, certain legal and policy considerations affect all
interested parties.112 The conversion of an obsolete oil or gas
platform into an artificial reef involves a complicated legal and
regulatory process.113 States must first create legislation that allows
them to accept ownership of an artificial reef located in federal
waters.114 Even if this legislation is created, questions still exist as to
the potential liability associated with assuming responsibility for a
decommissioned oil or gas platform as part of the Rigs-to-Reef
Project.115 This liability question has been addressed to some extent
by requiring oil and gas companies who participate in the Rigs-toReef Project to donate half of their removal cost savings, the cost
difference between partial and complete removal of the oil or gas
platform, to the state that accepts ownership of the artificial reef and
decommissioned oil or gas platform.116 In addition to this debate

as one of the primary purposes of NFEA is to create artificial reefs to improve
fishing. Id.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 9–10.
113
Id. at 9.
114
Id. at 10. Some states, particularly those located along the Gulf of
Mexico have created legislation that allows them to accept ownership of the
artificial reefs in federal waters. Thus, California may want to look at the
legislative acts of these states, especially Texas and Louisiana, before enacting its
own legislation. See DAUTERIVE, supra note 49.
115
BERNSTEIN, supra note 89, at 10. The Rigs-to-Reef Project has
generated some concern over the liability that states are potentially assuming when
accepting ownership of the artificial reefs created from decommissioned and
partially removed oil and gas platforms. Some opponents to the Rigs-to-Reef plan
assert that oil and gas companies are escaping any future liability for leaks or spills
that may occur in the future, and passing this liability off to the states. See
DAUTERIVE, supra note 49, at 4.
116
See DAUTERIVE, supra note 49, at 4. The money that the oil companies
are required to donate to the state accepting ownership of the decommissioned oil
or gas rig platform serves two purposes. The money pays for the upkeep of the
artificial reef and provides a fund that will cover at least some of the liability costs
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surrounding the Rigs-to-Reef Project and the legal and policy
considerations associated with the Project, the oil and gas drilling
platforms in California have additional characteristics that cause the
implementation of the Rigs-to-Reef Project in California to be more
complicated.117
E. Critical Differences Between Implementation of the Rigs-to-Reef
Project in the Gulf States and California
There are distinct differences between the California and Gulf
Coast marine environments and offshore oil and natural gas drilling
sites.118 These differences must be taken into consideration when
reviewing the implementation of the Rigs-to-Reef Project in
California.119 The first main difference between California and the
Gulf States is the topography of the coast and the seabed.120 The
offshore oil and natural gas platforms in the Gulf Coast are primarily
located in the northern portion of the Gulf of Mexico.121 The seabed
of the Gulf Coast, particularly the northern area where the oil and gas
platforms are located, is primarily composed of clay, silt, or sand.122
With this composition, the Gulf of Mexico has few natural reefs, and
the few natural reefs that do exist are located seventy-five or more

associated with ownership of the artificial reefs. Id.; see also Rothbach, supra note
7, at 293.
117
Hecht, supra note 22.
118
ECOLOGICAL ISSUES RELATED TO DECOMMISSIONING OF CALIFORNIA’S
OFESHORE PRODUCTION PLATFORMS, SELECT SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY COMM. ON
DECOMMISSIONING UNIV. OF CAL., at 22 (2008), available at
www.coastalresearchcenter.ucsb.edu/cmi/files/decommreport.pdf [hereinafter
ECOLOGICAL ISSUES RELATED TO DECOMMISSIONING].
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id. There are several thousand oil and gas drilling platforms located in
the northern portion of the Gulf Coast. Thus, the oil and gas production in the Gulf
Coast is highly concentrated to this particular area, whereas the oil and gas
production off the California coast is more widespread. Id. at 8, 22.
122
Id. at 22. There are a few natural rock reefs near the shore off of the
coast of Louisiana and Texas. However, it has been estimated that only about 1.6%
of the Gulf Coast area consists of hard bottom and reef habitats. Id.
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miles from shore.123 Thus, the topography of the Gulf of Mexico has
been a key factor in encouraging the Gulf States to create artificial
reefs, especially through the implementation of the Rigs-to-Reef
Project.124
On the other hand, the topography of the California coast and
seabed is largely rocky.125 The natural rocky seabed allows for the
development of natural reefs that can sustain marine reefs and fish
populations.126
Furthermore, oil and gas production off the
California coast remains more limited than in the Gulf of Mexico.127
Rather than the thousands of oil and gas platforms concentrated in
the northern part of the Gulf Coast, California only has a total of
twenty-seven offshore oil and gas platforms scattered throughout
both the federal and state waters.128 As California’s offshore oil and
gas platforms are not concentrated in one area, unlike the Gulf of

123

ECOLOGICAL ISSUES RELATED TO DECOMMISSIONING, supra note 118,

at 22.
124

Id. at 23. The numerous oil and gas platforms in the northern part of
the Gulf of Mexico provide rock-like structures on which reefs can develop. With
the abundance of these structures and the lack of hard bottom and reef habitats, the
oil and gas platforms have provided the Gulf States with a means to create artificial
reefs in order to increase fish reef populations. Id.
125
Id. at 22. California’s coastal seabed is primarily made up of rocky
reef habitat with large areas of rocky intertidal and shallow sub tidal habitats. Id.
126
Id. Unlike the Gulf States, California’s topography allows for the
development of natural reefs on the rocky seabed. Thus, California does not have
to depend on the oil and gas platforms to create reefs. Id.
127
Id. at 22. California outlawed offshore oil drilling after the Santa
Barbara Oil Spill of 1969. See Hecht, supra note 22; Clarke, supra note 24. Then,
in 1984, the Federal Government outlawed new offshore oil drilling platforms off
the coast of California. See Hecht, supra note 22. The combination of the state
and federal action essentially outlawing offshore oil drilling off the California
coast, prevented oil and gas production from rising to the same level as seen in the
Gulf of Mexico. ECOLOGICAL ISSUES RELATED TO DECOMMISSIONING, supra note
118, at 22.
128
ECOLOGICAL ISSUES RELATED TO DECOMMISSIONING, supra note 118,
at 23–24. The twenty-seven offshore oil and gas platforms are distributed in state
and federal waters across four general regions of the California coastline; the four
regions include the northern region by Point Conception, East Santa Barbara
Channel, West Santa Barbara Channel, and Orange County. Id. at 8.
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Mexico, the platform’s impact on the marine life and fish populations
is more difficult to determine.129
In addition to the topography, the Gulf Coast and California
also differ in their marine environments. The waters of the Gulf of
Mexico are populated by different species of fish than California.130
Various environmental studies have indicated that oil and gas
platforms have potentially increased the fish populations around the
oil and gas platforms in the Gulf of Mexico.131 However, the results
from these studies cannot be considered overly persuasive when used
to evaluate the impact that California oil and gas platforms would
have on fish populations.132 The difference in the fish species that
populate the two geographic regions indicates that the environmental
impact of implementing the Rigs-to-Reef Project in California may
drastically differ from the results of the implementation of the Project
in the Gulf of Mexico.133 Moreover, the oil and gas platforms off of
the California coast are located in much deeper water than the oil and
gas platforms in the Gulf Coast.134 Thus many of the oil and gas
129

Each of the four regions where California’s offshore gas and oil
platforms are located is characterized by unique water temperatures, current
conditions, and seabed compositions that affect the marine environments of each
area. Id. For example, the northern region by Point Conception is characterized by
colder water, a strong southern flowing current, and a rocky reef seabed, while the
southern portion of the Orange County area has warmer water with northern
flowing currents and mix of sandy and rocky seabed. Id. These varying conditions
have “important implications for the kinds of species inhabiting platforms and the
degree to which platforms contribute to regional abundance of hard bottom
habitat.” Id. at 8.
130
Id. at 23.
131
Id. at 7–8.
132
Id. at 23. Almost every environmental study evaluating the
environmental impact of decommissioned oil and gas platforms has been conducted
by looking at the fish populations of the Gulf Coast. This is partially due to the fact
that the Gulf States have been one of the only areas to allow widespread
implementation of the Rigs-to-Reef Project. Id.
133
ECOLOGICAL ISSUES RELATED TO DECOMMISSIONING, supra note 118,
at 23. In determining the impact of the decommissioning of oil and gas platforms
on different species of fish, the differences in the fish species’ “life history,
mobility, longevity, . . . [and] harvesting pressures” associated with the specific
geographic region must be considered. Id.
134
Hecht, supra note 22. Many of California’s oil and gas platforms are
located in water that is over 400 feet deep, with some sitting as deep as 1,000 feet.
See also ECOLOGICAL ISSUES RELATED TO DECOMMISSIONING, supra note 118, at
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platforms scheduled for decommissioning off the California coast
would be the first deep water platforms to be decommissioned.135
Considering these differences between the regions of the Gulf Coast
and the California coast, the results of implementing the Rigs-to-Reef
Project in the Gulf States may not be representative of the impact of
implementing the Project in California.136
II. CALIFORNIA’S INITIAL ATTEMPTS TO IMPLEMENT THE
RIGS-TO-REEF PROJECT
A.B. 2503 was not the first attempt by the California
Legislature to implement the Rigs-to-Reef Project. Over more than a
decade, the California Legislature has introduced three separate bills
in an attempt to implement the Rigs-to-Reef Project.137 Only the
third, and most recent bill, A.B. 2503, was successful.138
A. S.B. 2173
The first attempt to implement the Rigs-to-Reef Project in
California occurred in 1998 with S.B. 2173.139 The bill proposed to
extend California’s artificial reef program in both state and federal

9. Of all the oil and gas platforms that have been decommissioned in the Gulf of
Mexico or the North Sea, no fixed platform has been decommissioned that is at a
depth of more than 400 feet. Hecht, supra note 22.
135
Hecht, supra note 22.
136
Id.; see also ECOLOGICAL ISSUES RELATED TO DECOMMISSIONING,
supra note 118, at 23.
137
Hecht, supra note 22.
138
Id. In late August 2010, the California Legislature passed A.B. 2503.
On September 30, 2010, Governor Schwarzenegger signed the bill into law. Id.
Thus, it was finally possibe to begin implementing the Rigs-to-Reefs Project in
California.
139
MICHAEL VINCENT MCGINNIS ET AL., THE POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND
ECOLOGY OF DECOMMISSIONING OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS STRUCTURES, MMS OCS
STUDY 2001-006 65 (2001) (provided by MMS Cooperative Agreement Number
14-35-0001-30761), available at http://ocpc.msi.ucsb.edu/pdfs/WTPap6/WP6.pdf.
S.B. 2173 did not directly refer to the Rigs-to-Reef Project, but the bill
incorporated many of the technical and policy elements of the Project, in essence,
indirectly attempting to implement the national Rigs-to-Reef Project in California.
Id. at 65–66.
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waters to the Outer Continental Shelf.140 The bill originally focused
on the impact the artificial reefs would have on the recreational and
commercial fishing industries.141 This approach, however, was
quickly modified, and S.B. 2173 was amended to focus on the
potential environmental benefits that extending the artificial reef
program could have on protecting marine environments and
increasing fish populations.142 By amending S.B. 2173, Senator
McPherson hoped to gain more support for the bill by incorporating
the values of a wider political spectrum.143
S.B. 2173 also addressed some of the liability and political
concerns associated with extending the artificial reef program.144
One of the main concerns about the extension of the artificial reef
program was that the expansion of the program would be hindered by
budget and political constraints.145 In order to address these
concerns, the bill suggested the development of an artificial reef
program account, and a supplementary fund to be administered by
140

Id. Senator Bruce McPherson proposed S.B. 2173 after recognizing
that a decline in California’s marine life was having a detrimental impact on the
recreational and commercial fishing industries. Senator McPherson believed that
extending the artificial reef program would increase the fish population and limit
the impact on the fishing industries. Id.
141
Id.
142
Id. The amended bill did not completely depart from its focus on the
impact the expansion of the artificial reef program could have on recreational and
commercial fishing; instead, the amended bill discussed the potential for the
artificial reefs to protect and increase fish populations, which would in turn benefit
the commercial and recreational fishing industries that were vital to the California
economy. Id.
143
Id. at 66. The bill was reframed to focus on preserving and promoting
the California marine resources. There was still a substantial focus on sustaining
fish populations for recreation and commercial fishing; however, by making the
main concern the marine resources and environment, Senator McPherson hoped to
gain support from other political groups besides commercial and recreational
fishing lobbyists. Id.
144
MCGINNIS ET AL., supra note 139, at 66.
145
Id. S.B. 2173 called for the extension of California’s artificial reef
program into federal waters. This extension of the reefs could potentially be very
costly to implement and upkeep. Thus, the legislature was extremely concerned
about the long-term budgetary impact of the bill. Furthermore, the extension would
also require increased supervision of the project, particularly regarding the
allocation of funds for the upkeep of the artificial reefs. This need for increased
supervision could lead to political constraints on the program. Id.
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California Endowment for the Preservation of Marine Resources.146
Furthermore, S.B. 2173 also required that the oil or gas company that
owned and operated the offshore drilling platform contribute ten
percent of the removal cost savings into the artificial reef account.147
If the state accepted liability of the oil or natural gas rig, however, the
oil or gas company was required to allocate fifty percent of its
removal cost savings.148
B. Analysis of S.B. 2173
Despite its initial amendments to the bill’s focus149 and the
additional budget and policy considerations, S.B. 2173 failed to gain
support and was tabled early in the 1998 legislative session.150 One
reason for the lack of support may have been the way that the bill
was initially proposed. The initial focus on preserving fish
populations in order to promote recreational and commercial fishing
within California caused the potential benefits to the marine
environment to seem like a secondary concern.151 This may have
prevented environmental groups and lobbyists from fully supporting
the extension of California’s artificial reefs program. Thus, without
the environmentalists’ support, S.B. 2173’s only main lobbyists were
146

Id. In 1985, the California Fish and Game Code appropriated $500,000
to California’s artificial reef program. Id. Proponents of S.B. 2173 feared that this
appropriation would prevent further funding from being allocated to the extension
of the artificial reef program. Thus, by creating a separate account specifically for
the artificial reef program and establishing an agency, California Endowment for
the Preservation of Marine Resources, to oversee the allocation of the funds in this
account, the bill sought to alleviate some of the budgetary and political fears
surrounding the expansion of the program. Id. at 66.
147
Id. at 66. By requiring the oil and gas companies to contribute a
portion of their removal cost savings to the state artificial reef program account, the
bill provided a means of generating additional income in order to implement the
extension and upkeep of the artificial reef program.
148
Id. By requiring the oil and gas companies to allocate an additional
fifty percent to the state artificial reef program account if the state assumed liability
for the decommissioned oil or natural gas platform, the bill attempted to generate
additional funds that would be available if any long-term liability issues arose with
the extension of the artificial reef program.
149
See supra note 142–143.
150
MCGINNIS ET AL., supra note 139, at 66.
151
See supra note 142–143.
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those representing recreational and commercial fishermen. Though
these lobby groups remain fairly strong and influential within
California’s legislature,152 the support of these groups alone was not
sufficient to persuade legislators to extend the artificial reef program
considering the potential policy and budgetary ramifications of the
extension.
Furthermore, attempting to implement the Rigs-to-Reef
Project in California through S.B. 2173 was likely premature.
Though the Federal Government created the Rigs-to-Reef Project in
1984,153 by 1999, the Project was only beginning to be implemented
by the Gulf States.154 The Gulf States have been significantly more
willing to implement the Rigs-to-Reef Project than California. Thus,
considering that by 1998 the Rigs-to-Reef Project was only being
implemented at a minimal level by the Gulf States, it is not surprising
that when S.B. 2173 was introduced in 1998, it was met with
skepticism and limited support.155 Though the bill attempted to
account for some of the budget and policy concerns associated with
the Rigs-to-Reef Project,156 these fears were simply too pervasive and
the Project too new to receive widespread support from the California
Legislature. Therefore, it is not surprising that California’s first
attempt to implement the Rigs-to-Reef Project failed.157

152

See Rothbach, supra note 7, at 290. Recreational fisherman remain one
of the strongest supporters of the Rigs-to-Reef Project and have been one the most
active lobbyist groups to encourage implementation of the Project in California. Id.
153
See What is Rigs-to-Reefs, supra note 42.
154
See supra note 65. The Gulf States have been the most willing to
implement the Rigs-to-Reef Project; however, even with this willingness, the
implementation has been slow. By 1999, less than one percent of the
decommissioned oil and natural gas drilling platforms in the Gulf of Mexico had
been accepted and donated to the Rigs-to-Reef Project. Id.
155
California, only recently began implementing the Rigs-to-Reef Project
with the passage of A.B. 2503; the Gulf States, on the other hand, began
implementing the Project as early as 1987. See DAUTERIVE, supra note 49, at 3.
156
See supra note 146–148.
157
Not only did S.B. 2173 fail to become a law, it never even reached the
legislative floor; instead S.B. 2173 was tabled while still in its legislative
committee. See Hecht, supra note 22.
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C. S.B. 241/S.B 1
The California Legislature’s next attempt to implement the
Rigs-to-Reef Project occurred shortly after S.B. 2173 failed. Senator
Dede Alpert originally attempted to revive S.B. 2173, but when this
failed, he introduced a new bill, S.B. 241, in 2000.158 Senator Alpert
modeled S.B 241 after S.B. 2173, and adopted many of its
provisions.159 With S.B. 241, however, Senator Alpert sought to
focus more on the technical feasibility, the potential environmental
impact, and the budgetary and policy considerations associated with
implementing the Rigs-to-Reef Project.160
With regards to the technical feasibility of implementing the
Rigs-to-Reef Project in California, S.B. 241 asserted that
implementation of the Project was feasible because implementing the
Project had been discussed previously, and California already had an
artificial reef program.161 S.B. 241 established the California
Department of Fish and Game as the primary state agency
responsible for overseeing the implementation and management of
the artificial reefs; however, other state agencies would also be
involved in the process.162 The importance S.B. 241 placed on

158

MCGINNIS ET AL., supra note 139, at 66–67. Originally Senator Alpert
attempted to revive S.B. 2173 in January of 1999; however, he was once again
unable to garner a significant amount of support or interest in S.B. 2173, and thus,
the bill was tabled in April of 1999. Id. Recognizing that the S.B. 2173 would
need to be significantly amended in order to progress any further, Senator Alpert
drafted a new bill, modeled after S.B. 2173, which he introduced in January 2000.
Id.
159
Id. at 67.
160
Id.
161
Id. This assertion, that the Rigs-to-Reef Project was feasible because
the California Legislature had considered the Project’s implementation, previously
demonstrates the fact that S.B. 241 was modeled after the failed S.B. 2173.
162
Id. at 67. By giving the primary responsibility of overseeing and
managing the implementation of the Rigs-to-Reef Project to the California
Department of Fish and Game (CDFG), S.B 241 provided the CDFG with the
authority to implement the Project. At the same time, S.B. 241 also established that
other agencies could also assume some of the burdens associated with
implementation, including the technical planning and support. Id. Furthermore,
S.B. 241 incentivized these other state agencies to become involved in the
implementation process with the potential for the agencies to share in the
management and control of artificial reef program funds. Id.
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interagency coordination and cooperation of the implementation
process was one of the main differences between S.B. 241 and its
predecessor, S.B. 2173.163 Furthermore, in order to generate
additional support for S.B 241, Senator Alpert reinforced his
assertions about the technical feasibility of the implementation of the
Rigs-to-Reef Project by asking the California State University system
to scientifically evaluate the environmental concerns associated with
the Rigs-to-Reef Project.164 By asking for an outside, independent
perspective, Senator Alpert lent credibility to S.B. 241.165
S.B. 241 also focused on the potential environmental benefits
associated with implementing the Rigs-to-Reef Project.166 The bill
sought to bring attention to the concept that the oil and gas platforms
already served as artificial reefs. 167 Artificial reefs develop on the
platforms; hence, the platforms help to create new marine
environments, and do not simply attract fish populations from

163

MCGINNIS ET AL., supra note 139, at 67. S.B. 241 considered the roles
that state agencies such as the State Lands Commission, the California Coastal
Commission, and the Bay Conservation and Development Commission would have
in the implementation process and addressed how implementation would be
affected by state and federal laws, including the California Environmental Quality
Act and the federal Clean Water Act. Id. Thus, S.B. 241 took a broader and more
comprehensive approach to analyzing the technical feasibility of implementing the
Rigs-to-Reef Project in California.
164
Id. at 67. Senator Alpert convened a “Blue Ribbon Panel” through
which he sought the California State University system’s assistance in determining
scientific questions that needed to be resolved, evaluating the existing data about
the impact of the Rigs-to-Reef Project on the marine environment and resources,
and comparing the partial decommissioning allowed by the Project with other
decommissioning alternatives. Id.
165
One of the main reasons that S.B. 2173 failed to garner sufficient
support to make it out of its legislative committee was the fact that the bill lacked
scientific research about the impact of the Rigs-to-Reef Project. Id. This lack of
scientific information caused legislators to be skeptical about voting for a bill
without having information about the long-term effects.
166
MCGINNIS ET AL., supra note 139, at 67.
167
Id. One of the requirements of the National Fishing Enforcement Act
(NFEA), which set some of the parameters for the development of artificial reefs,
was that the materials utilized to create artificial reefs had to be approved by the
NFEA. Oil and natural gas platforms had already been approved by the NFEA and
thus could be used to create artificial reefs without administrative delay or
additional approval. Id. at 67.
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previously existing reefs.168 Moreover, S.B. 241 required that the
artificial reefs created by implementing the Rigs-to-Reef Project be
designated as marine reserves.169 This requirement to designate the
artificial reefs as marine reserves emphasized that the focus of S.B.
241 was on the potential environmental benefits associated with
implementing the Rigs-to-Reef Project. With the environmental
benefits as the focus, S.B. 241 was able to generate a broader support
base by appealing to public interests beyond commercial and
recreational fishing.170
Finally, S.B. 241 attempted to directly address some of the
budgetary and policy concerns associated with the implementation of
the Rigs-to-Reef Project.171
As mentioned above, S.B. 241
advocated interagency cooperation and management of California’s
artificial reef program.172 Involving multiple agencies in the
implementation of the Rigs-to-Reef Project would increase the
validity of the Project and distribute the implementation
responsibilities across multiple state agencies.173 In regards to the
budgetary concerns associated with implementation, S.B. 241
focused on long-term funding for the Project.174 In order to facilitate
this long-term funding, S.B. 241 called for the creation of an
Artificial Reef Endowment Fund.175 The bill then required that a

168

Id.
Id. at 67–68. By designating the artificial reefs developing on the
decommissioned oil and gas platforms as marine reserves, California could more
closely monitor the growth and development of the marine environment around
these artificial reefs, while protecting the developing marine environment from
over-fishing.
170
Id. at 68. Another significant difference between S.B. 241 and S.B.
2173 was the fact that S.B. 241 framed implementation of the Rigs-to-Reef Project
as having a broader impact than simply affecting fish populations. Thus, a larger
segment of the California public was likely to take an interest in the bill, which in
turn helped to generate more support for the bill in the California legislature.
171
MCGINNIS ET AL., supra note 139, at 68.
172
See supra note 161–163 and accompanying text.
173
MCGINNIS ET AL., supra note 139, at 66. By involving multiple state
agencies in the implementation process, S.B. 241 sought to prevent any one agency
from becoming overburdened by the implementation process. Id.
174
Id. at 68.
175
Id. The Artificial Reef Endowment Fund (AREF) would be separate
from any fund accounts held by the California Department of Fish and Game.
169
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portion of the oil or gas companies’ removal cost savings be split
between the Artificial Reef Endowment Fund and the California
Department of Fish and Game.176 The depth of the decommissioned
oil or natural gas platform would determine the proportion of the
removal cost savings that would be required to be allocated to the
state agency accounts.177
Senator Alpert was still in the process of generating support
for S.B. 241 when the 1999-2000 California Legislative Session
came to a close.178 Thus, just as with its predecessor S.B. 2173,
Senator Alpert was forced to table179 S.B. 241 until the debate could
be renewed in the 2000-2001 legislative session.180 At the start of the
2000-2001 California legislative Session, Senator Alpert
reintroduced S.B. 241 as S.B. 1.181 S.B. 1 incorporated the
adjustments that had been made to S.B. 241,182 and with these

Thus, the funds in the AREF would be solely for upkeep and implementation of the
Rigs-to-Reef Project. Id.
176
Id.
177
Id. The proportion of the removal cost savings that the oil and gas
companies would be required to donate to the two stage agency funds would be
determined based on the depth of the oil or natural gas platform being
decommissioned; therefore, the deeper the platform being decommissioned, the
greater the proportion of the removal cost savings that would be allocated to the
state funds. Id. This plan for determining the proportion of removal cost savings
by depth was designed to offset some of the liability concerns associated with
California assuming responsibility for the decommissioned oil and gas platforms;
furthermore, by creating a relationship between the depth of the platform and the
proportion of removal cost savings allocated to the state funds, S.B. 241 attempted
to account for the increased cost in maintaining deep artificial reefs. Id.
178
MCGINNIS ET AL., supra note 139, at 68.
179
Tabling a bill means that the, “motion is not debatable, and agreement
to the motion is equivalent to defeating the question tabled. The motion is used to
dispose quickly of questions the Senate does not wish to consider further.” See
Senate Glossary, Motion to Table, UNITED STATES SENATE (Feb. 4, 2012),
www.senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/b_three_sections_with_teasers/glossary.htm
(last visited Jan. 1, 2012).
180
MCGINNIS ET AL., supra note 139, at 68, 72.
181
Complete Bill History, OFFICIAL CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE
INFORMATION, available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/0102/bill/sen/sb_0001-0050/sb_1_bill_20020110_history.html.
182
See supra notes 158, 162–173 and accompanying text. S.B. 1 was
essentially the same bill as S.B. 241; however, due to the end of the 1999-2000
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adjustments, S.B. 1 was able to garner enough support to be approved
by both the California Assembly and Senate.183 After passing both
houses of the California Legislature, S.B. 1 was submitted to
Governor Davis to be signed into law.184 Despite having the support
of both the Assembly and the Senate, S.B. 1 was vetoed by Governor
Davis.185 Therefore, with the veto of S.B. 1, the second attempt to
implement the Rigs-to-Reef Project in California failed.186
D. Analysis of S.B. 241/S.B. 1
Governor Davis explained his veto of S.B 1 by saying that
“‘[t]here is no conclusive evidence that converted platforms enhance
marine species or produce net benefits to the environment.’”187 In
this explanation, Governor Davis is eluding to the lack of scientific
research that had been done on the impact that implementation of the
Rigs-to-Reef Project would have on marine environments. Even
though both the California Assembly and the Senate passed S.B. 1,
the bill faced strong opposition from various environmental groups
and lobbyists.188 This opposition by some environmentalists relates
to the idea that S.B 1 was attempting to implement the Rigs-to-Reef
Project in California before scientific research had been conducted on
the long-term effects of the Project on marine environments.
The provisions of S.B. 1 themselves evidence the lack of
scientific data regarding the long-term effects on the marine
environment. In order to generate support for the bill, Senator Alpert
sought the help of the California State University system to evaluate
legislative session, the numbering on the bill was changed when it was
reintroduced in the 2000-2001 legislative session.
183
See Hecht, supra note 22; see also Rothbach, supra note 7, at 288.
184
Rothbach, supra note 7, at 288.
185
See Hecht, supra note 22.
186
See id.; see also Rothbach, supra note 7, at 288.
187
Hecht, supra note 22 (quoting Governor Davis’s explanation of his
decision to veto S.B. 1).
188
When S.B. 1 was being debated in both the California Assembly and
the Senate, the commercial fishermen opposing the bill aligned themselves with
environmentalists who also opposed the implementation of the Rigs-to-Reef
Project. See Rothbach, supra note 7, at 288. See supra Part I.D (discussing the
various parties involved in the debate surrounding the implementation of the Rigsto-Reef Project).
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the environmental concerns and impact associated with implementing
the Rigs-to-Reef Project in California.189 Though Senator Alpert
may have had good intentions in creating this “Blue Ribbon Panel,”
the Panel should have been created before S.B. 1 was written and
submitted to the Legislature for debate. The fact that the bill itself
created the Panel meant that any information provided by the Panel
could not be incorporated into S.B. 1 before it underwent legislative
debate. S.B. 1 did take the first steps toward encouraging
environmental studies of the long-term impact the Rigs-to-Reef
Project would have on marine environments. The bill itself,
however, did not include any conclusive information showing that
converting the decommissioned oil and natural gas platforms into
artificial reefs would benefit the existing marine environment in
California.
One of the main reasons that S.B. 1 only suggested that
environmental studies be conducted rather than presenting actual
scientific data about the impact of the Rigs-to-Reef Project on marine
environments is that, at the time the bill was proposed, there was
practically no scientific data available. S.B. 1 was modeled after S.B.
241, and proposed in the 2000-2001 legislative session.190 The Rigsto-Reef Project only became significantly implemented in the Gulf
States as of 1999.191
Therefore, the Project had not been
implemented long enough for scientific studies to evaluate the longterm effects of the implementation of the Project on the marine
environments. Furthermore, the only oil and gas platforms that had
been decommissioned as artificial reefs through the Rigs-to-Reef
Project were located in the Gulf of Mexico.192 Any scientific
information obtained from these decommissioned platforms that
could have been included in S.B. 1 would be addressing the impact

189

See supra note 163–164.
See supra note 182.
191
See DAUTERIVE, supra note 49. In 1987, the first offshore oil platform
was accepted into the Rigs-to-Reef Project in the Gulf of Mexico. Id. Even if
studies had been done on the impact this decommissioned oil platform had on the
marine environment, the study would only be measuring the impact of the Rigs-toReef Project over a decade. A decade can hardly be sufficient to allow for a
concrete scientific evaluation of the impact of the Project on the marine
environment.
192
See DAUTERIVE, supra note 49, at 63.
190
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the Project had on the marine environments of the Gulf of Mexico.
Therefore, this scientific data would not be convincing given the vast
differences in topography and marine environments of the Gulf of
Mexico and California.193
With S.B. 1 being vetoed based on the lack of concrete
scientific evidence regarding the long-term effects and potential
environmental benefits of implementing the Rigs-to-Reef Project in
California, legislative attempts to implement the Project in California
stalled. It took almost a decade for the next bill addressing the
implementation of the Project in California to be proposed in the
California Legislature.
III. CALIFORNIA’S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RIGS-TO-REEF PROJECT:
A.B. 2503
In February 2010, Assembly Member John A. Perez proposed
a new bill, A.B. 2503, which addressed the implementation of the
Rigs-to-Reef Project in California.194 With this proposal, Assembly
Member Perez revived the debate surrounding the implementation of
the Rigs-to-Reef Project.195 A.B. 2503 adopted some of the ideas
from the previous two bills that proposed the implementation of the
Project. However, Assembly Member Perez also recognized that the
two previous bills failed to gain enough support in order to
successfully implement the Project.196 Thus, A.B. 2503 included

193

See supra Part I.E.
Assembly Bill No. 2503, CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE INFORMATION,
available at
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=200920100AB2
503&search_keywords=#.
195
The last bill proposing the implementation of the Rigs-to-Reef Project
in California failed in 2001. See supra notes 181, 186. A.B. 2503 was not
introduced until 2010; therefore, the debate surrounding the implementation of
Rigs-to-Reef Project in California had received little attention from both legislators
and the public for almost a decade. This proposal, however, brought the debate to
the forefront. Thus, interested parties once again created alliances and began
lobbying for and against the bill. See supra note 70 and accompanying text
(discussing the development of the coalitions that formed between various
supporters and opponents of the Project).
196 Hecht, supra note 22.
194
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additional provisions in order to address many of the concerns that
surround the Rigs-to-Reef Project.197
Like S.B. 1,198 A.B. 2503 primarily focused on the potential
environmental benefits associated with implementing the Rigs-toReef Project in California. A.B. 2503 emphasized the importance of
preserving the diversity and abundance of the marine life in
California’s coastal waters.199 The bill then went further to assert
that the state programs dedicated to preserving California’s marine
resources were subject to inadequate and unstable funding.200 By
referencing the lack of funding for the preservation programs, A.B.
2503 insinuated that by implementing the Rigs-to-Reef Project in
California, greater funding would be available to help preserve the
marine environments.201 Focusing on the potential environmental
impact of implementing the Project allowed A.B. 2503 to appeal to
broader public interests.202
With the greater public interest,
Assembly Member Perez increased his chances of generating enough
support to get A.B. 2503 passed in the California Legislature.203
Furthermore, A.B. 2503 also incorporated the case-by-case
analysis that had been used in both S.B. 2173 and SB. 1.204 The caseby-case analysis allowed the state agencies assigned to regulate and

197

Id.
As S.B. 1 replaced S.B. 241 and the two were essentially the same bill,
S.B. 241 will be referenced as part of S.B. 1 in the following portions of this
analysis.
199
CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 6601 (West 2012). A.B. 2503 asserted that
the diversity of species and ecosystems in California’s coastal waters was
important for the “public health and well-being, ecological health, and oceandependent economic activities.” Id.
200
Id. § 6601(b).
201
Id. § 6601(g). The portion of the removal cost savings allowing for the
partial removal of the decommissioned oil and natural gas platforms could be
allocated to the maintenance and enhancement of the artificial reefs created by the
implementation of the Rigs-to-Reef Project. Id. Thus, A.B. 2503 could provide
additional funding for the protection of the marine environments.
202
Assembly Member Perez probably modeled the focus of A.B. 2503 off
of S.B. 1 because S.B. 1 was able to garner enough support to pass the California
legislature by focusing on the potential environmental benefits of implementing the
Rigs-to-Reef Project. See supra note 183.
203
CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 6601(g).
204
Id. § 6603.
198

796

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

32-2

implement the Rigs-to-Reef Project in California to determine on an
individual basis which oil and natural gas platforms qualified for the
partial removal allowed by the Rigs-to-Reef Project.205 This
provided the state agencies with greater control over the
implementation process.206 In order to facilitate this case-by-case
analysis, A.B. 2503 followed S.B. 1’s administrative structure, and
established an administrative plan that provided for interagency
cooperation and management of the Rigs-to-Reef Project.207 A.B.
2503 divided the responsibilities involved in the implementation of
the Project between three agencies within the California Natural
Resources Agency.208 The three agencies included the California
Department of Fish and Game, the California Ocean Protection
Council, and the California State Lands Commission.209 Though
each of these subsidiary agencies was responsible for a different part
of the implementation process, they all reported back to the
California Natural Resources Agency. 210 Therefore, A.B. 2503
established the California Natural Resources Agency as the primary
agency in control of the implementation of the Rigs-to-Reef Project
in California.211
Even though the three subsidiary agencies ultimately report to
the California Natural Resources Agency, each subsidiary agency
plays an important role in the application review process. A.B. 2503
established the California Department of Fish and Game (CDFG) as
the agency responsible for accepting or denying the oil and gas
companies applications for the Rigs-to-Reef Project.212
In
determining whether to accept or deny an application, the CDFG
evaluates whether or not California should accept ownership of the

205

Id. By forcing each oil and natural gas platform to individually qualify
for the Rigs-to-Reef Project, A.B. 2503 sought to prevent over implementation of
the Rigs-to-Reef Project and ensure that the platforms donated to the Project would
potentially provide environmental benefits.
206
Id.
207
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 71530 (West 2010).
208
Hecht, supra note 22.
209
Id.; see also CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 71530 (West 2010).
210
Hecht, supra note 22.
211
CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 6604(b) (West 2012).
212
Hecht, supra note 22.
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oil or natural gas platform.213 The partial decommissioning of the
platforms, allowed by the Rigs-to-Reef Project, may only take place
after the CDFG has determined that California should take ownership
of the platform; thus, the CDFG plays a key role in granting or
denying final approval of the implementation process.214
Under A.B. 2503, the California Ocean Protection Council
(OPC), is allocated one of the most important roles in the
implementation process.215 The OPC is tasked with evaluating the
oil and gas companies’ application to the Rigs-to-Reef Project in
order to determine whether allowing the partial decommissioning of
the oil or natural gas platform will benefit the marine environment.216
The bill provides OPC with the authority to conduct scientific
research, with the help of the California University and California
State University systems,217 in order to determine whether the partial
removal will benefit the marine environment more than complete
removal of the platform.218 The OPC must conduct this scientific
research for each proposal, and evaluate the environmental impact on
a case-by-case basis.219 Thus, considering that one of the primary
focuses of A.B. 2503 was on potential environmental benefits
213

Id. One of the requirements for federal approval of the partial removal
of an oil or natural gas platform is that the state has accepted ownership of the
platform through accepting the platform as a donation to the Rigs-to-Reef Project.
Id. However, the CDFG has to be careful when approving the oil and gas
companies’ applications, as acceptance into the program means that California has
accepted ownership of the decommissioned platform. With the ownership comes
questions regarding whether the state is also assuming liability for any issues that
may arise from the decommissioning and upkeep of the platform.
214
CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 6620 (West 2010); see also Hecht, supra
note 22.
215
Hecht, supra note 22.
216
Id. By placing the OPC in charge of determining whether the
application for partial removal will benefit the marine environment, A.B. 2503
placed one of the most controversial aspects of the debate surrounding the Rigs-toReef Project in the hands of a single state agency. The OPC not only must conduct
scientific studies on the environmental impact of the partial decommissioning
proposal, but also must determine that the partial removal would provide greater
environmental benefits than complete removal. Furthermore, the OPC must
conduct this analysis for each application. Id.
217
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 71500(a)(4) (West 2010).
218
CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 6601(g) (West 2010).
219
Hecht, supra note 22.
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associated with implementing the Rigs-to-Reef Project in
California,220 the OPC plays one of the most crucial and demanding
roles involved in the implementation process.221
The third agency, the State Lands Commission (SLC), is
responsible for the calculation and allocation of the removal cost
savings.222 Under A.B. 2503, oil and gas companies must allocate
between 55% to 80% of their removal cost savings to the specified
state funds created for the implementation of the Project.223 The
SLC’s main responsibility is to ensure that the oil and gas
companies’ calculations of removal cost savings are accurate and
reasonable.224 A.B. 2503 provides the SLC with the authority to
request information and documentation relating to the oil and gas
220

See supra notes 199, 191–202.
Hecht, supra note 22. One of the main reasons that A.B. 2503 was able
to generate enough support to pass both the Assembly and Senate of the California
legislature was its focus on the environmental impact, especially the potential for
increasing fish populations and enhancing marine environments, that implementing
the Rigs-to-Reef Project could have in California’s coastal waters. With this focus,
the OPC will be under constant scrutiny from both proponents and opponents of the
bill, especially environmental groups. Therefore, the OPC must ensure that each
decision it makes regarding whether the partial decommissioning will benefit the
marine environment is based on accurate scientific information that will withstand
intense scrutiny.
222
Id.
223
CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 6618(c) (West 2010). Instead of basing the
percentage of the removal cost savings on the depth of each oil or natural gas
platform, as was attempted in S.B. 1, A.B. 2503 establishes that between 55% to
80% of the removal cost savings must be allocated to the state funds; what
percentage, within this range, an oil or gas company must allocate depends on
when the company’s proposal for acceptance to the Rigs-to-Reef Project is
approved. Id. For example, if an oil or gas company’s proposal is approved before
January 1, 2017, the company only has to allocate 55% of its removal cost savings
to the state funds. However, if the company’s proposal is approved on or after
January 1, 2023, the company must allocate 80% of its savings to the state. Thus,
the allocation percentage increases the longer it takes for a company’s proposal to
be approved. Id.
224
Id. § 6614(b). The implementation of the Rigs-to-Reef Project in
California would allow oil and gas companies to partially remove their oil and
natural gas platforms, thus saving substantial costs on the removal process. A
portion of this removal cost savings must be allocated to various state funds
associated with the implementation of the Project. SLC is the agency that ensures
the oil and gas companies are providing accurate information about their expected
removal cost savings. Id.
221
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companies’ calculation of their expected removal cost savings in
order to ensure the accuracy of the calculation.225 The bill also
provides that SLC’s determination in regards to the accuracy of the
removal cost savings is final, and may only be revised or amended by
the SLC.226 Therefore, the SLC plays an important role in ensuring
that the state has adequate funds to effectively implement the Rigsto-Reef Project in California.227
In addition to these provisions, A.B. 2503 also included a
number of other requirements that both the state agencies and the oil
and gas companies must meet before their application for acceptance
into the Project will be approved.228 The first additional requirement
is that all applications for partial removal must comply with the
California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).229 The CEQA
requires that, when making decisions that could affect the
environment, California state agencies must consider all potential
environmental impacts of a proposed project, including determining
whether any viable alternatives exist that might lessen the
environmental impact of the Project.230
By including this
requirement in the bill, A.B. 2503 emphasized the importance the bill
was placing on the environment by attempting to ensure that all
options were evaluated before determining whether or not to allow
partial removal of the oil and gas platforms.
The next set of requirements outline additional administrative
procedures that the state agencies must comply with when evaluating
oil and gas companies’ applications.231 A.B. 2503 established that
the CDFG must hold public hearings when evaluating the partial

225

Id. § 6614(d). By giving the SLC the authority to compel the oil and
gas companies to provide information and documentation of their calculations for
their expected removal cost savings, A.B. 2503 discourages oil and gas companies
from underestimating their savings in order to avoid having to donate a larger
amount to the state funds. Thus, the SLC serves as a check on the oil and gas
companies.
226
Id. § 6614(e).
227
Hecht, supra note 22.
228
Id.
229
CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 6604 (West 2010); see also Hecht, supra
note 22.
230
Hecht, supra note 22.
231
Id.
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removal plans.232 These hearings are a means for the CDFG to
inform the public about the partial removal proposals, and provide an
opportunity for the public to voice its support for and opposition to
the implementation of the Rigs-to-Reef Project. The bill also
requires the CDFG to generate a plan outlining the management of
the artificial reef and the oil or natural gas platform after partial
removal.233 By including this provision, A.B. 2503 became the first
California bill to force a state agency involved in the implementation
process to consider and design a plan addressing the long-term
impact of the implementation of the Project.234
Furthermore, A.B. 2503 requires that the oil and gas
companies provide all of the funding necessary for the SLC and the
OPC to evaluate the partial removal application.235 This provision is
especially pertinent to the OPC, as under A.B. 2503, the OPC must
conduct scientific research evaluating the impact that the partial
removal of an oil or natural gas platform will have on the marine
environment for each application.236
Finally, A.B. 2503 requires that the oil and gas companies
indemnify the State of California and the California National
Resources Agency against “any and all liability” that may result from
the partial removal process.237 The bill provides the California

232

CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 6615(c) (West 2010).
Id. § 6611.
234
Hecht, supra note 22.
235
CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 6601(h)(4) (West 2010). Any costs
associated with the SLC evaluating the accuracy and reasonableness of the oil and
gas companies’ calculation of their removal cost savings must be borne by the
companies, and not the state. Additionally, the bill requires that the oil and gas
companies fund the scientific research performed by the OPC when it considers the
environmental impact of the partial removal decommissioning process. Id.
236
See supra notes 216, 221. Though the OPC can use the California
University and California State University systems to help conduct this scientific
research, the research itself has the potential to be very costly, particularly when
research must be done to evaluate each application for partial removal. By forcing
the oil and gas companies to pay for the research, A.B. 2503 mitigates California’s
costs in implementing the Rigs-to-Reef Project.
237
CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 6616(f) (West 2010). The indemnification
clause specifically states that an application cannot be accepted unless the applicant
“indemnifies the state and the department, to the extent permitted by law, against
any and all liability that may result, including but not limited to, active negligence,
233
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Natural Resources Agency with the flexibility to establish different
indemnification clauses for each application as long as the clause
adequately protects California and its state agencies from liability.238
In relation to the indemnification clause, A.B. 2503 also requires that
the oil or gas owner/operator of the oil or natural gas platform retain
continuing liability for any “seepage or release of oil” resulting from
the approval of a partial removal decommissioning plan.239 Under
the bill, California must accept ownership of any oil or natural gas
platform located in federal waters before it can approve a partial
decommissioning plan of a platform located in federal water.240 By
including this continuing liability clause, the bill attempts to prevent
California from facing liability issues normally associated with the
ownership of oil and natural gas platforms.241
As demonstrated by the inclusion of all of these detailed
provisions and requirements, A.B. 2503 sought to address many of
the concerns that caused the previous two bills, S.B. 2173 and S.B. 1,
to fail. A.B. 2503 generated enough public and legislative support to
pass both houses of the California Legislature on September 15,
2010.242 Governor Schwarzenegger signed A.B. 2503 into law on

and including defending the state and the department against any claims against the
state for any actions the state undertakes . . . .” Id.
238
Id. Some of the options that A.B. 2503 suggests in designing the
indemnification clause include “an insurance policy, cash settlement, or other
mechanism as determined by” the California Natural Resources Agency. Id.
In regards to what constitutes adequate protection, the bill is somewhat
vague. However, it does suggest that one measure of adequacy is whether
California can defend itself against any liability claims associated with the partial
removal process. Id.
239
CAL. FISH & GAME CODE at § 6605.
240
Hecht, supra note 22.
241
CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 6605 (West 2010). The continuing liability
provision, in A.B. 2503, attempts to address two issues California faces with the
implementation of the Rigs-to-Reef Project. The first concern is to limit
California’s immediate and long-term liability associated with partial
decommissioning. The second concern is California’s ability to include oil and
natural gas platforms located in federal waters in the Rigs-to-Reef Project. Id. By
requiring applicants to agree to the continuing liability provision, the bill attempts
to eliminate the risk of long-term liability while providing California with a means
to incorporate platforms located in federal waters into the Rigs-to-Reef Project.
242
AB-2503 Ocean Resources: Marine Resources And Preservation,
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September 30, 2010, creating the California Marine Resources
Legacy Act.243 Thus, A.B. 2503 became the first successful bill to
garner enough support to implement the Rigs-to-Reef Project in
California.244
A. Analysis of A.B. 2503 and its Potential Impact on California
Though A.B. 2503 was passed and signed into law, the bill
leaves many questions, regarding the implementation process,
unanswered. One main concern associated with the bill is that it
constrains the independent evaluative process of the state agencies in
charge of managing the implementation of the Project.245 This
constraint is particularly evident with the CDFG. Under A.B. 2503,
the CDFG is responsible for approving the partial removal
applications.246 With this responsibility, it seems logical that A.B.
2503 would also endow the CDFG with the authority to use its
discretion in the approval process. The language in A.B. 2503,
however, seems to limit the CDFG’s discretion by requiring that the
CDFG conditionally approve any partial removal plan if the plan
complies with the proper process and the SLC determines the plan
will benefit the marine environment.247 This language indicates that
the CDFG only has minimal discretion in the approval process, and
must give deference to the SLC’s environmental decisions.
Therefore, the CDFG may be forced to approve proposals that it
would otherwise have rejected.248 Hence, the CDFG does not appear
to play an independent and evaluative role in the implementation
process.
Moreover, the CDFG’s apparent lack of discretion may lead
to conflicts with A.B. 2503’s provision requiring that the partial

CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE INFORMATION,
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml (click on the
“HISTORY” tab) (last visited Jan. 1, 2013).
243
Id.
244
See generally Hecht, supra note 22.
245
Id.
246
See supra notes 213–214.
247
Hecht, supra note 22.
248
Id.
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removal applications comply with CEQA.249 The CEQA requires
that California state agencies, like the CDFG, evaluate all potential
environmental impacts and viable alternatives before approving any
proposal that would impact the environment.250 By constraining the
CDFG’s discretion and forcing the CDFG to approve proposals that
the SLC accepts as environmentally beneficial, A.B. 2503 prevents
the CDFG from considering any viable alternatives to the proposed
partial removal plan. Also, the CEQA requires that the CDFG, as the
agency ultimately approving or rejecting a partial removal proposal,
must consider the environmental impact of the proposal before
making its determination.251 A.B. 2503, however, allocates this
environmental analysis to the SLC.252 Therefore, the bill’s provision,
requiring compliance with the CEQA, and the administrative
structure created by A.B. 2503 conflict. With this conflict, the
California courts may be forced to intervene in order to harmonize
these provisions of the CEQA and the newly passed A.B. 2503.253
The administrative structure established by A.B. 2503 will also likely
require the California Legislature to pass additional legislation
clarifying the authority of each of the state agencies involved in the
management and implementation process.
However, in the
meantime, the question as to which agency has the ultimate authority
to approve or decline an applicant’s proposal remains unanswered.
The second main concern associated with A.B. 2503’s
implementation of the Rigs-to-Reef Project in California is the
amount of discretion and control that the bill seems to give to oil and
gas companies254 that first becomes evident with the removal cost
savings. Under A.B. 2503, the oil and gas companies independently
determine their expected removal cost savings.255 The bill does
249

Id.
See supra note 229; see also Hecht, supra note 22.
251
Hecht, supra note 22.
252
See supra notes 224–225.
253
A.B. 2503 became the California Marine Resources Legacy Act when
it was signed into law in September of 2010. See Hecht supra note 22. With this
conflict, the California courts would have to assume a legislative role and resolve
the conflicts between the CEQA and the California Marine Resources Legacy Act.
Id.
254
Hecht, supra note 22.
255
See supra notes 223–224.
250
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provide the SLC with the authority to evaluate the accuracy and
reasonableness of the oil and gas companies estimate.256 However,
this evaluation is based on information and documentation provided
by the companies.257 The majority of the funds for implementation
and management of the Project come from the proportion of removal
cost savings allocated to the state’s agency funds. Hence, by
providing the removal cost savings estimate and the information used
to evaluate this estimate, the oil and gas companies essentially
control the funding that will be allocated to California’s Rigs-to-Reef
Project.
Additionally, the oil and gas companies design the partial
removal proposals to be approved by the OPC.258 After receiving the
application, the OPC compares the environmental impact of the
partial removal proposal with the environmental impact that complete
removal would have on the marine environment.259 However, A.B.
2503 broadly defines partial removal as an alternative to complete
removal.260 Thus, the oil and gas companies will be able to define
practically any decommissioning proposal as a partial removal. OPC
is then forced to approve these broadly defined partial removal
proposals, even if their beneficial impact on the marine environment
is only slightly greater than complete removal.261 Thus, the broad
definition of partial removal forces the OPC to give potentially
inappropriate discretion to the oil and gas companies’ partial removal
proposals.
Furthermore, the oil and gas companies also fund all of the
environmental research associated with the approval process.262
Under A.B. 2503, the OPC must conduct scientific research for each
partial removal proposal in order to determine whether allowing the
partial removal will result in a net benefit to the marine

256

See supra note 225.
CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 6614(d) (West 2010).
258
Hecht, supra note 22.
259
See supra note 216.
260
CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 6602(m) (West 2010). A.B. 2503 defines
partial removal as “an alternative to full removal of an offshore oil structure . . . .”
Id.
261
Hecht, supra note 22.
262
CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 6601(h)(4) (West 2010).
257
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environment.263 The fact that the oil companies fund the OPC’s
research once again vests control of the implementation process in
the companies. The oil and gas companies’ control over the funding
raises questions regarding whether the scientific data will be truly
unbiased or whether the companies will be able to influence the data
to reflect the needs and wants of the oil and gas companies.264
The third main concern associated with A.B. 2503 revolves
around liability issues and the indemnity clause. Though A.B. 2503
includes a continuing liability clause and an indemnification
clause,265 California may still face potential liability problems
associated with the implementation of the Rigs-to-Reef Project. The
continuing liability clause only addresses liabilities associated with
seepage or release of oil or other chemicals; thus, this clause fails to
address whether California or the oil and gas companies are
responsible for any liabilities associated with the management and
ownership of the decommissioned platforms.266 Considering that
these potential liabilities are not mentioned in the continuing liability
clause, it appears that California would be responsible for any legal
claims made in relation to the management and ownership of the
platforms.267

263

See supra note 216.
Though forcing the oil and gas companies to fund the scientific
research saves California state agencies money during the implementation process,
it also has the potential of creating deferential relationships between the oil and gas
companies and the research institutions. The institutions will want to continue to
receive funding in order to conduct their research on the environmental impacts of
the implementation of the Project, and thus in order to receive this funding the
institutions may present data that is slightly biased towards the oil and gas
companies.
265
The continuing liability clause in A.B. 2503 provides that oil and gas
companies are to remain liable for any seepage or release of oil or other toxic
chemicals from the offshore platforms.
See supra note 238–241.
The
indemnification clause requires the oil and gas companies to sign a clause, which
provides a means for California to pay for any future liability costs associated with
the partial removal of the oil and natural gas platforms before decommissioning can
occur. See supra notes 237–238.
266
Hecht, supra note 22.
267
Id. Examples of management and ownership claims that California
may be liable for, according to the language of A.B. 2503, are any injuries that
occur in relation to the structure, such as injuries suffered by ship owners or divers
264
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Proponents of A.B. 2503 may argue that even if California is
liable for claims associated with the management or operation of the
platforms, the costs associated with these liabilities are covered by
the indemnity funds generated by the indemnification clause.
However, in the long-term, these indemnity funds may not be
sufficient to cover all costs associated with the partial removal
process. A.B. 2503 specifically provides the California National
Resources Agency with the flexibility to create different types of
indemnification clauses for each application.268
The only
requirement for these indemnification clauses is that when accepting
a clause, the California Natural Resources Agency must ensure that
the funds provided by the clause will adequately allow the state to
defend itself against any liability claims and pay any resulting
judgments if necessary.269
These indemnification clauses, however, are drafted and
accepted before the decommissioning process begins.270 Therefore, it
remains unclear how the California Natural Resources Agency could
possibly know how much funding is necessary to include in the
indemnification clauses in order to ensure that the oil and gas
companies are paying for the long-term liability costs. A.B. 2503’s
indemnification clause provision seems too vague and too flexible to
ensure that the funds set aside for liability claims will not run, thus
forcing California to assume the burden of paying for the liability
claims in the long-term.271 Finally, even if the indemnification
clauses do provide enough funding to meet long-term liability
concerns, California may end up having to engage in costly and timeconsuming litigation with the oil and gas companies in order to
receive the funds promised in the indemnification clauses.272
The final major concern regarding A.B. 2503’s
implementation of the Rigs-to-Reef Project in California is the
environmental impact the Project will have on California’s marine
environments. A.B. 2503 attempted to lessen this concern by
who may be engaging in recreational or commercial activities on the artificial reef
created by the decommissioned platform. Id.
268
See supra note 238.
269
CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 6616(f); see also supra note 235.
270
Hecht, supra note 22.
271
Id.
272
Id.
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requiring the OPC to conduct scientific research on whether the
partial removal proposal would result in a net benefit to the marine
environment.273 However, this research does not provide any
information about the long-term environmental impact of the partial
removal proposal. In an attempt to support its claims that artificial
reefs created by partial removal generate new marine environments
and increase fish populations, A.B. 2503 relies on the scientific data
collected from studies observing the impact that the Rigs-to-Reef
Project has had on the marine environments in the Gulf of Mexico.274
With the drastic differences between the coastal environments of the
Gulf Coast and those of California,275 A.B. 2503’s reliance on this
scientific data is questionable.276 Not only is the scientific data
regarding the impact of the partial removal on marine environments
inconclusive,277 but A.B. 2503 also seems to assume that the Rigs-toReef Project will have the same effect on California’s marine
environments that the Project has had on marine environments in the
Gulf States.
In addition to relying on the alleged success of the Rigs-toReef Project in the Gulf Coast, A.B. 2503 also emphasizes the
findings of the 2007 study conducted by the California Ocean
Science Trust (COST).278 The COST study found that based on the
results of other studies, partial removal of oil and natural gas
platforms could potentially benefit marine environments by limiting
the disturbance of already existing artificial reefs developing on the
platforms.279 Though this conclusion does encourage implementation
of the Rigs-to-Reef Project, A.B. 2503’s reliance on the study was
premature. The COST study was meant to be an ongoing process,
which sought to inform the California Legislature about the potential
environmental and economic consequences associated with

273

See supra notes 216–217.
See supra note 132. Almost all of the studies conducted on the
environmental impact of the Rigs-to-Reef Project have focused on the Gulf of
Mexico, as this area has been the most willing to implement the Project.
275
See supra notes 122–129; see also supra Part I.E.
276
See supra notes 121–129.
277
See supra note 87.
278
Hecht, supra note 22.
279
See supra note 95.
274
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implementing the Rigs-to-Reef Project.280 The California Natural
Resources Agency, which commissioned the COST study, intended
the study to produce a report, which the California Legislature could
use to help develop an implementation policy that would address the
environmental and economic consequences of the Rigs-to-Reef
Project.281 However, before the first COST report was completed,
A.B. 2503 was proposed.282 Thus, A.B. 2503’s reliance on the study
could not have been as extensive as the bill purports. Instead, A.B.
2503 prematurely proposed the implementation of the Rigs-to-Reef
Project in California before the legislature could evaluate the COST
study’s findings and before further scientific research could be
conducted to determine the potential long-term environmental and
economic impact of the Project.
IV. CONCLUSION
With the passage of A.B. 2503 in 2010, the Rigs-to-Reef
Project was finally implemented in California. Although A.B. 2503
attempted to create a comprehensive plan for the implementation
process, the bill failed to address many important details associated
with implementing the Rigs-to-Reef Project in California. Primarily,
A.B. 2503 provides the oil and gas companies with too much control
over the implementation process, which limits the authority of state
administrative agencies in charge of the management and approval of
the Project. Furthermore, A.B. 2503 exposes California to potential
long-term liability costs and lawsuits without ensuring that the oil
and gas companies will provide the funds necessary to cover these
potential liability costs. Finally, A.B. 2503 relies on inconclusive
scientific information by proposing implementation of the Project
before studies could be conducted on the long-term effects the partial
removal project would have on California’s diverse marine
environment.
The California Legislature, and potentially the
California courts, will likely have to enact additional laws in order to
supplement the shortcomings of A.B. 2503. Overall, A.B. 2503 was
shortsighted and failed to consider the potential long-term

280

See generally BERNSTEIN, supra note 89, at i.
Hecht, supra note 22.
282
Id.
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environmental and economic consequences that may arise from the
implementation of the Rigs-to-Reef Project in California.

